A CRITIQUE OF BERNARD HARING'S APPLICATION OF THE DOUBLE EFFECT PRINCIPLE
Paul J. MlCALLEF T HE PRINCIPLE of the double effect received its c1assical formulation in the writings of Thomas Aquinas who discussed it in relation to self-defence. 1 It may be stated as follows:
1. Where an action, lawful in itse1f, 2. produces two (or more) effects, one of which is good and the other (or others) evil, 3. the evil effect may be permitted but not intended, 4. provided that : a) the good effect is not achieved by means of the evil effect; b) there is a proportionately serious reason for permitting the unintended evil effect: and. c) other morally un question able means are ordinarily unavailable. 2 In this essay, 1 am concerned not so much with the principle itself or with any detailed analysis of it as with a particular application of the principle proposed by Bernard Haring.
Haring uses the following case, typical of the kind of dilemmas that arise in medical ethics, to illustrate how rigidity in applying the principle of the double effect renders the principle meaningless. However, the contrary position, his own, illustrates how f1cxibility in applying the principle shows up the non-applicability of the principlc itself.
The case is totd by a gynecologist and reads as follows: 1 was once called upon to perform an operation on a woman in the fourth month of pregnancy, to remove a malign uterine tumor. On the womb there were Haring daims that the solution proposed by the noted moralist is int1exibly based on the distinction between direct and indirect abortion and results "in too literaI or mechanical applications". So he goes on to propose a solution of his own which, he says, follows a less artificialline of reasoning.
On the great moral certainty, he says, that without direct intervention there is no chance of survival for both the mother and the child, the doctor "accepts the only chance to protect and serve life which Divine Providence has left to him. He saves the life of the mother while he does not truly deprive the fetus of its right to live, since it would not survive in any event if he failed to save the mother's Iife. Moreover, the preservation of the mother's fertility is an additional service to life". 4 Haring's solution of the particular case he brings up disregarcls the requirements of the double effect principle. On the contrary, his solution falls outside the framework of the princip le and he assumes that he applies the principle less artificially simply by providing a distinction between malicious and non-malicious abortion. In this regard, while he condemns the former he appears to justify the latter mainly on the grounds that there is a proportionately serious reason for permitting the destruction of the fetus and "on the great moral certainty" that the fetus had no chance of survival.
Beyond what Haring calls the too literaI or mechanical applications of the principle and what in fact any explanation of the principle gives the impression of being (in the context, "dissection of the principle" would be a better way of putting it), therc is a very important aspect which Haring overlooks. The distinctions and the principle that arises from them are commonly thought to provide the basis for an exception to the absolu te or near-absolute moral condemnation of abortion. In this context. abortion is thought to be permissible provided it comes within the terms and conditions of the double effect principle. In other words, il may appear that there is an area of therapeutic abortion which is morally admissible (i.e., when the directl)' intended action is a morally licit medical intervention), and another area which is not (i.e., when fetallife is direetly involved as an end in itself or as a means to an end).
There is, in fact, more to the principle than appearing to justify particular cases of therapeutic abortion. The full import of the principle is not that it points up an exception nor that it lays down conditions as to when abortion is right and when it is wrong, nor that it is an attempt to achieve a moral balance betwecn maternaI and fetal rights. The thrust of the principle lies precisely in its attempt to establish the faet that there are actions which, conducive to the destruction of fetallife though they be, are no! in fact abortion in the moral sense. Most gynecologists would even say that they are not abortion in the medical sense either. In fact, bath spontaneous abortion and indirect abortion are instances or illustrations of what abortion is not. even though for practical purposes retention of the terminology concerning direct and indirect actions is unavoidable.
Much of the controversy (and misunderstanding) surrounding the principle and its applications is largely due ta the kind of language used to describe the resulting evil effect.
The evil effect is invariably described as a foreseen but unintended by-product of a directly-willed action. It is then argued that as long as the evil effeet is in some way "voluntary" or somehow eomes within the intentional order, it makes no difference whether it is willed in the moral sense or foreseen in the practical sense -which is basically why this dichotomy is ail too often considered to be a distinction without a difference or one that implies a choiee between two evils and of justifying an otherwise immoral action conveniently labelled as a foreseen but unintended and unavoidable evil consequence, simply by providing what may weil appear to be a mere "verbal escape mechanism".'
It must be admitted that within this context, the term "voluntary" and its derivatives or its variations and, in general, the terminology used misleading. What is willed is the direct act and whatever effect is directly intended and sought. The evil efTect is neither intendecl nor willecl in any way. Grantecl that it is foreseen ancl foreseen to be unavoidable, it is not in any way voluntary. For this reason "voluntary" shoulcl not, in my opinion, be part of the definition of the foreseen cvil effect. In other words, the principle is an attempt to offer guidelines to distinguish as well as it possibly can between what is sought as an end in itself and what is permitted or tolerated as an unavoidable result of an otherwise morally acceptable action.
To this effect, Dr. Mary S. Calderone tells of a group of eminent doctors who implicitly affirmed the validity of this aspect of the principle when they refusecl to In Haring's application, the mother would have been saved by the direct termination of the pregnancy and in the circumstances whîch he describes his solution falls outside the framework of the double effect principle, His solution may indeed be, as he daims, "simple and more convincing" but his use of words like "less literai", "less mechanical" does not make it any more acceptable within the double effect principle, 1 hasten to add, however, that it may be acceptable on other grounds, At this point, it wou Id be worth reviewing briefly the position taken by the noted moralist cited by the gynecologist. The moralist daims that the moral course to folJow would have been "to remove the bleeding uterus with the fetus itself', Su ch an action, in the moralist's opinion, would have come under the double effect principle, l am not 50 sure that he is right either.
The moralist daims that the doctor "was not permitted to interrupt the pregnancy while leaving the womb intact", Interrupting the pregnancy and removing the uterus would have been, in his opinion, "a lawful direct intention and action to save life", The moralist's position leaves no doubt as to the manner in which the mother should have been saved: the mother should have been saved by dircctly removing a vital organ -and with it the child -thereby rendering the mother incapable of bearing other children.
The double effect principle's general terms of reference ensure that its applications will not be measured by the foot rule nor ca1culated with the assistance of tables, If one must therefore allow it to serve us father than to strangle us, the princip le does not appear to stipulate the conditions laid down by the moralist. In the circumstances, a less drastic course of action, as one might have to put it, would have been sufficient. In this particular case, the less drastic course of action would have been to remove the child because as Haring rightly points out, in agreement with the gynecologist, the child wou Id have died in any event as would the mother.
The uterus contracted by the removal of the child, It would also have contracted by the removal of the uterus Ïtself. But removal of the uterus would not have been in the best interests of the mother and 1 would say of life itself.
It would seem then that both Haring and the moralist are at fault : Haring in that he discusses the case outside the framework of the princip le and assumes that his solution falls within it; the moralist in that he attempts to make the principle applicable to a case where it is not.
The case proposed puts forward two very simple courses of action: on the one hand, preservation of the mother's life and the various consequences accompanying this action; on the other, removal of the uterus and the death of the child. In ethical terms, whether the preservation of the mother's life and fertility is less commendable than the removal of a pregnant uterus. It is not a question of a choice between two evils; if anything, it is rather a question of two values though the value that would have been safeguarded by the removal of both uterus and child is not easy to see.
Within the terms briet1y explained above, the gynecologist's intervention and Haring's interpretation outside the framework of the double effeet principle appears to have been the medically reasonable and morally humane course ta follow. This position, however, represents the beginning and not the end of the ethical argument involving martal conflicts between mother and unborn child.
